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Power relations within the area of blockchain 
governance are complex by definition and a 
comprehensive analysis that links technological and 
institutional elements is missing to date. The research 
that is presented with this article focuses on the 
visualization of the shifting power relations with the 
introduction of blockchain. For this purpose, the 
analysis leverages an adjusted version of the multi-
stakeholder influence mapping tool. The analysis 
considers the various stakeholders within the multi-
layered blockchain technology stack and compares 
three fundamental blockchain scenarios, including 
public and private blockchain settings. 
The findings show that public administrations 
face indeed less power with the introduction of 
blockchain, while new stakeholders come into play 
who wield influence rather uncontrolled. Nonetheless, 
public administrations are not powerless overall and 
remain influential stakeholders. This paper concludes 
that blockchain governance is not as democratic as 
blockchain enthusiasts tend to argue and derives 
corresponding opportunities for further research.  
1. Introduction 
Public administrations and political 
representatives regard joint efforts between public and 
non-public stakeholders to produce public services as 
increasingly important. This is a reaction to pressing 
topics resting inside and outside public 
administrations, such as scarce public funds, limited 
internal resources, eroding trust of society and 
challenges of globalization. A prime example for the 
current need of collaboration between public and non-
public stakeholders is the ongoing global health crisis 
due to COVID-19. Observed governmental responses 
(e.g. [1]) actively ask for a close collaboration between 
public health authorities and citizens with combined 
resources in order to co-produce public health 
services. In general, this governance-focused 
paradigm is often referred to as New Public 
Governance [2]. A successful implementation of this 
paradigm also requires the ability to cope and align 
with multiple involved stakeholders. 
There are already various solutions of information 
technology (IT) available to support collaborative 
modes of working. However, the technology of 
blockchain takes the discussion of scholars and 
practitioners to another level because this technology 
is attributed to act as an institutional technology [3]. 
Scholars of IT often claim it could fundamentally 
redefine stakeholder interactions by offering secure 
peer-to-peer working styles and thereby even improve 
democracy [4]. Advocates of blockchain also question 
the role of public administration. At the same time, the 
discussion around the institutional consequences of 
blockchain is rather unstructured. It is the 
technological complexity and the high number of 
relevant stakeholders on governance level that makes 
it difficult to understand the technology itself and 
corresponding power relations. For this reason, further 
research is demanded that links technological and 
institutional perspectives [5]. 
The research presented with this article aims to 
structure and visualize the shifting power relations in 
the area of blockchain governance by applying 
comprehensive stakeholder analysis techniques, such 
as multi-level stakeholder influence mapping tool [6]. 
Furthermore, the research seeks to evaluate 
possibilities and limitations of public administrations 
to influence the development of blockchain-based 
public services. 
This article summarizes the efforts and results of 
this research. First, the theoretical foundations of this 
research are laid out with an overview of 
interorganizational public service delivery and the 
blockchain technology. Second, the design of this 
research is introduced in greater detail by describing 
the applied step-by-step approach. Third, major 
findings are then examined and discussed. And finally, 
conclusions are drawn with respect to the aim of this 
research before limitations to the results and 
opportunities for further research are discussed.  






This chapter elaborates on the theoretical 
foundations of this article. First, the shift from 
intraorganizational towards interorganizational 
governance is presented and amplified with a 
discussion on the role of power and e-governance. 
Second, the foundations of the blockchain technology 
are introduced. These also include elaborations on the 
matters of blockchain governance and the 
technology’s multiple stack layers. 
2.1. Public service delivery – towards 
interorganizational governance 
Public administrations offer public goods and 
services to their various stakeholders and expect them 
to follow their rules and to pay tax. The public 
administrations do so as they largely rely on laws and 
potential penalties these may include [7]. They 
provide those goods and services with limited 
capacities. Especially time, funds and knowledge 
about the interdependences of service provisioning are 
scarce [8, 9]. Latter limitation should not surprise 
when multiple stakeholders are involved or even 
national boundaries are crossed [10] in consequence of 
e.g. technologies that know no borders or supply 
chains that easily span across nations [11, 12]. 
Additionally, private actors increasingly engage as 
public service providers [9]. Thus, the number of 
elements of a public service increases which makes it 
harder to predict and control the service outcomes, i.e. 
the complexity increases [13, 14]. 
As one of the most recent and popular public 
sector reforms, New Public Management fails to offer 
adequate responses to these constraints due to its 
intraorganizational focus on efficiency [15]. 
Accordingly, new approaches are required that 
consider the shifting roles [16] and tackle the growing 
interorganizational governance efforts within the 
public service delivery system [10]. Collaborative 
forms of governance have thereby gained significant 
importance in public sector reforms [17] because 
traditional patterns of policy making, e.g. top-down 
decision-making or confrontation, appear to be hardly 
suitable for recent challenges [18]. These forms seek 
to resolve conflicts and facilitate cooperation among 
public and non-public stakeholders [19] in order to 
improve efficiency and quality of public services. This 
governance-focused paradigm is also referred to as 
New Public Governance. With New Public 
Governance, public and non-public stakeholders 
combine their resources to provide public services in 
co-production [2]. 
Indeed, this would be a promising development. 
At the same time, this development presents “a 
challenge to the role of government” [15] which 
requires careful examination. When activities are not 
provided by public administration any longer, but 
instead by non-public stakeholders, this raises 
concerns in terms of e.g. accountability, legitimacy 
[15] or governability of the societal system [11]. There 
are many factors that could influence this complex 
governance system and which can only be partly 
controlled by the governing system [11]. Stakeholders 
are likely to bring in diverging sets of e.g. goals, 
capacities, interests and dependencies [10]. This may 
give reason for “conflicts and power issues” [20] 
leading to challenging coordination and balancing 
efforts [21] to finally jointly provide public services. 
Companies could either struggle in case they have to 
follow divergent laws of multiple jurisdictions or 
assume a superior role if they can rely on a large-scale 
organization and corresponding resources, while latter 
scenario is rather common practice and not theoretical 
thought experiment [21]. In summary, effective 
strategies for coordination and cooperation in 
governance networks are essential to prevent 
unbalanced actions, the abuse of power by 
stakeholders or an inadequate provision of public 
services [22]. 
Consequently, power and influence are two 
important factors in governance networks. The two 
concepts are closely linked with each other but still can 
be clearly distinguished. Both concepts strive for the 
achievement of one’s actor interest. In contrast to the 
power, influence can achieve the interests without any 
forces or sanctions [23, 24]. Using power always 
means to rely on a basis of power, e.g. knowledge, 
resources [6] or authority. Interestingly, where power 
and influence lie and how they are “conceived in 
studies of governance and institutions is often not 
discussed.” [6] This issue needs to be tackled when 
stakeholders apparently play an increasing role in 
governance networks. It can help to better understand 
stakeholder relationships within governance networks 
and, subsequently, support the design of proper 
governance models [6]. 
The analysis of stakeholders in governance 
networks that follow the concept of New Public 
Governance should also consider the use of IT. 
Electronic government is widely integrated in today’s 
governmental processes of policymaking and policy 
implementation [25]. Thus, transforming a public 
administration would go along with a complementary 
transformation of IT. The benefits of IT for 
governance purposes, or e-governance, is already 
being discussed today. There are claims e-governance 
could result in intrinsically changed relationships in 
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society and “help to achieve democratic means and 
even transform people’s social and political 
consciousness.” [26] Furthermore, e-governance 
should e.g. increase the efficiency, the accessibility of 
data and also enable a power shift from governments 
to individuals [4]. 
Interestingly, the idea of conflicting interests and 
powers relations within collaborative governance 
networks to provide public services needs to be 
expanded onto the technology level [4]. The more 
stakeholders are involved with their own IT capacities, 
the higher the overall dependence on these IT assets 
[21]. And due to high complexities in IT provisioning 
(e.g. cloud-based public services operated by third 
parties in data centers across the world), it is hard to 
tell where power lies in the end [4]. Elsner [21] already 
claimed years ago that an analysis should focus on the 
roles of power. This claim still holds true because the 
rather new technology of blockchain raises high hopes 
to fundamentally change the interactions among 
stakeholders. Does the introduction of blockchain 
represent a shift in powers for the provision of public 
services? In which direction – vertically and 
horizontally? 
2.2. Blockchain – the institutional technology 
of governance 
Blockchain is a distributed ledger technology 
which allows to securely transfer digital assets of any 
kind from one user to another in a peer-to-peer fashion. 
Thus, it can be applied to a variety of fields of 
application [27]. The most prominent use of 
blockchain can be observed within the field of 
cryptocurrencies, e.g. Bitcoin or Ether as being two 
well-known cryptocurrencies. Essentially, blockchain 
is a network of nodes that stores continuously updated 
and synchronized data based on predefined rules every 
node agreed to. Self-executable programs, so-called 
smart contracts, further improve the efficiency of 
transactions [28] and reduce the need of human 
intervention. 
Although blockchain is described by an 
alternating number of characteristics [29], there are 
four essential characteristics which in combination 
build the strength of this technology [30]: immutable 
data as a result of cryptography and the unique design 
of blocks, decentralized and bidirectional exchange 
between users without an intermediary, consensus 
among nodes that the stored data is accurate and a 
transparent history of all transactions [30]. 
Furthermore, blockchain is not a monolithic 
system. It rather is an ecosystem of multiple, 
interconnected layers [28]. There are different 
approaches to organize the layers depending on 
whether it should only entail technical layers or also 
institutional layers [31]. With regard to this article’s 
aim, it was decided to rely on the technical layers. The 
sum of all technical layers will be called blockchain 
technology stack [32, 33] in the following. Table 1 
introduces the layers of the blockchain technology 
stack and presents a brief description per layer. 
 





Application This layer sits on top of the 
blockchain layer and includes so-
called decentralized applications 
(DApps) and supporting 
application frameworks. DApps 
are stored on the blockchain and 
executed by the nodes [28]. 
Stakeholders at this level can be 
e.g. software developers or end 
users. 
Blockchain This layer essentially includes the 
consensus mechanism of the 
blockchain network [28, 34], e.g. 
proof-of-work or proof-of-
authority. It contains the rules 
how transactions are validated 
and subsequently stored by the 
nodes [31]. Also, fundamental 
characteristics of a blockchain 
network, such as permissionless 
access, can be assigned to this 
layer. Stakeholders at this level 
can be e.g. node operators or core 
software developers. 
Internet This is the bottom layer. It is 
crucial for the blockchain 
network which requires constant 
internet connectivity in order to 
operate properly [35]. 
Stakeholders at this level can be 
e.g. internet service providers or 
public administrations in the role 
of regulators. 
 
The essential blockchain characteristics of this 
multi-layered network have been leading to an 
increasing interest in blockchain among scientists and 
practitioners [36]. Because blockchain represents a 
fundamental change of user interaction and its 
presumed impact on common roles, with 
intermediaries being potentially eliminated [37], this 
technology is perceived as an institutional technology 
of governance [34]. Intermediaries, it is argued, may 
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often leverage information asymmetry out of self-
interest or in “inefficient, or corrupt ways.” [38] While 
blockchain is thus presented as the solution to these 
issues, others argue (e.g. [39]) the introduction of 
blockchain may give rise to new challenges to 
overcome self-interest of stakeholders. 
In general, potentials to use and participate in a 
blockchain network depend on configuration where 
two fundamentals can be distinguished. A public and 
permissionless blockchain solution (e.g. Bitcoin or 
Ethereum) is open to any individual or organization 
that wants to use, operate or further develop the 
network for their individual reasons. A public 
blockchain can be accessed globally, not bound by 
borders, which makes it hard for single public entities 
to enforce the law of their own jurisdiction. Adequate 
governance of this network appears to be challenging 
due to its open nature [40]. In contrast to public 
blockchains, private blockchains seem easier to handle 
in terms of governance. They rely on central 
authorities, normally the owners of the networks 
organized in a consortium, who have the say when it 
comes to fundamental decisions and they also decide 
on user access and privileges [5, 28]. But it is precisely 
the centralized setup which leaves room for criticism 
since it could be interpreted as a contradiction to 
blockchain’s idea of decentralization [28]. However, 
owners rely on the private setup in hope for efficiency 
gains [28] and increased governability [41]. 
There is a larger consensus among scientists that 
the choice to go for a public or private blockchain 
influences the governability of a blockchain network. 
However, this is a rather vague conclusion of the 
institutional consequences and the roles that are likely 
to change. Proper scientific analyses are rare to date. 
This is not surprising because most scientists still 
focus on cryptocurrencies and technical issues of 
blockchain [36]. Therefore, it is argued in favor of 
further assessments [40, 42]. This seems necessary to 
better understand the effects on governance associated 
with the selection of either private or public 
blockchains and to pinpoint “risks and drawbacks” 
[40], wherever they occur. This could provide hands-
on orientation to scientists and practitioners alike and 
contribute to the discussion on blockchain governance 
models. 
Blockchain governance essentially refers to two 
principles: governance by blockchain and governance 
of blockchain [35]. When blockchain is leveraged to 
govern non-technical, functional processes (e.g. 
collaborative public services between a public 
administration and its citizens) or organizations, this 
governance is achieved by the use of blockchain. 
Blockchain itself requires its own governance 
structures and processes because it is in a constant 
process of development, operation and maintenance 
[5]. This is referred to as governance of blockchain. 
Governance decisions affecting the blockchain 
network can have an impact on the qualities of 
governance by blockchain. 
On-chain or off-chain procedures can be applied 
to implement governance by or of blockchain. On-
chain governance refers to technical rules directly 
embedded into the code allowing a more efficient and 
strict way of implementation [28, 35]. For instance, 
rules embedded on the blockchain layer will be 
mandatory for the upper application layer and its 
DApps and frameworks. Processes and other forces of 
off-chain governance, however, affect a blockchain 
network and its stakeholders from the outside [35]. 
These forces, e.g. national laws or informal rules of 
communities, “operate at the social and institutional 
level, rather than at the technical level.” [35] 
Consequently, the human factor comes into play 
which makes off-chain governance more complex and 
less predictable than on-chain governance. 
The social and institutional factor at governance 
level presents a challenge to blockchain networks. The 
initial intention of blockchain enthusiasts was to take 
away power from centralized stakeholders and 
distribute the power to many other individuals [28], 
“enabling a more even distribution of power and 
wealth… [and leading] to increased participation and 
public engagement.” [35] This belief is to be 
challenged with respect to the stakeholders at each 
blockchain stack layer. Governance of blockchain 
partly requires new roles, e.g. core software 
developers of public blockchains, that coexist with 
established roles. So, there might be a shift of power 
from today’s centralized stakeholders. But this brings 
up two questions: How much power is shifted really? 
Are there new powerful centralized stakeholders 
instead of an even distribution of power? 
Some scientists already estimate that blockchain 
networks could give rise to oligarchies at technology 
level [35, 42, 43] who could ultimately impact non-
blockchain related, functional or political governance 
decisions. Power would be “still divided unequally.” 
[44] It is the aim of this article to examine these claims 
by a clear presentation of possible new power relations 
in blockchain networks. 
3. Methodology 
This chapter introduces the methodology, 
including a step-by-step process description. This 
methodology is built on multiple complementary tools 
of stakeholder analysis. It is this mix of tools that 
allows to achieve this article’s aim of structuring and 
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visualizing shifting power relations among 
stakeholders. 
It was concluded in the previous chapter that 
stakeholder analysis is often neglected within 
governance sciences. Not surprisingly, the number of 
tools for practitioners and researchers alike to 
understand power relations and define appropriate 
measures [6] to shape governance models is limited. 
Within the area of stakeholder analysis, however, the 
decisional method provides a promising approach to 
gain this understanding by considering qualitative data 
and investigating “power according to [stakeholders’] 
participation in decision-making.” [45] This method 
contains tools like the power versus interest grid, bases 
of power and direction of interest diagram and the 
stakeholder influence mapping [45]. It is the adoption 
of latter by Sova et al. [6], in particular, that offers a 
valuable methodological foundation for this article’s 
research – the Multi-level Stakeholder Influence 
Mapping (MSIM). 
Similar to the stakeholder influence mapping 
(SIM), MSIM seeks to analyze the relationship of 
stakeholders or stakeholder groups towards a decision-
making scenario or policy focus “within complex 
system regimes.” [6] It does not primarily aim at 
investigating the relationship among stakeholders. 
These relationships are only relevant by extension [6]. 
The influence of one stakeholder on the policy focus 
is of particular interest [46]. The enhancement and 
great advantage of MSIM over SIM lies in its ability 
to create an comprehensive view on one policy focus 
spanning across multiple stakeholder levels [6].  
Depending on the level of aggregation, results of 
the stakeholder analysis merge into one or more visual 
maps, each containing individual stakeholder 
characteristics, including the relevant stakeholders and 
their group size, “the degree of influence that they hold 
over the [scenario], and their relationships with each 
other.” [46] The closeness of stakeholders to one 
another displays the degree of potential conflict or 
cooperation [6]. 
To gather those stakeholder characteristics, the 
commonly used step-by-step approach needs 
adjustments to meet the article’s aim in response to the 
low number of available blockchain implementations 
in the public sector. The original interview-based 
approach which would allow to identify stakeholders, 
their group size and influence is, thus, replaced by a 
comprehensive desk research in combination with the 
additional use of tools of stakeholder analysis. The 
following adjusted, stepwise MSIM approach was 
applied for this research: 
Step 1: Define policy focus. The policy focus 
reflects the overall issue in scope [46] of this research. 
The influence of stakeholders is measured by the 
stakeholder’s influence on the policy. Because this 
research seeks to compare blockchain and non-
blockchain scenarios, the policy focus needs to be 
framed more general and not exclusively to meet 
blockchain scenarios. Consequently, the policy focus 
for this research is phrased “Establishing and making 
adjustments to domestic public service”. 
Step 2: Define scenarios. Scenarios are usually 
defined to understand the development of stakeholder 
influence on a policy focus over time [6]. In this 
research, those scenarios are derived from the three 
fundamental options to use or not to use blockchain: 
Private blockchain, public blockchain and 
conventional use of IT, i.e. no blockchain is used. 
To increase the usability of this research’s results, 
existing blockchain implementations were considered. 
With respect to the private blockchain, the Swedish 
Mapping, Cadastral and Land Registration Authority 
implemented a solution to transfer land titles. The 
public blockchain scenario is represented by the 
Ministry for Education and Employment of Malta that 
implemented a solution to issue and authenticate 
educational credentials. The conventional scenario is 
based on characteristics of the IT of both the Swedish 
and Maltese public administrations (e.g. use of cloud 
services by third parties) gathered by literature 
research to support a before and after comparison as 
realistic as possible. 
Step 3: Identify appropriate stakeholder levels. 
As shown with section 2.2, the blockchain network is 
not a monolithic system. It rather consists of three 
essential stack layers, i.e. application layer, blockchain 
layer and internet layer. These stack layers can be 
applied to the private and public blockchain scenarios. 
Correspondingly, appropriate layers for the 
conventional scenario are application layer, public 
administration infrastructure layer and internet layer. 
Latter layer refers to the same layer as within the 
blockchain scenarios. In contrast to blockchain’s 
decentralized application layer, the conventional 
application layer is rather focused on centralized 
applications. Additionally, the public administration 
infrastructure layer is founded on the widely exercised 
Do-It-Yourself approach of public administrations to 
run their own IT development and operations units 
supported by third parties. 
Step 4: Identify stakeholders. An extensive 
literature review on (non-)blockchain stakeholders 
was conducted. The literature revealed a wide range of 
stakeholders for blockchain in general, but some of 
them appeared not be relevant for the respective 
scenarios. Only stakeholders relevant for at least one 
scenario were considered going forward and mapped 
to each scenario and layer, if applicable. Results were 
noted in a stakeholder list. 
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Step 5: Estimate group size. For each relevant 
stakeholder, the group size was estimated and 
classified in categories of “smallest”, “small”, “big” 
and “biggest”. The information per stakeholder was 
added to the stakeholder list. 
Step 6: Determine stakeholder influence and 
relationships. This is a key step of this methodology 
and a divergence from the conventional MSIM 
methodology. Instead of relying on interviews to 
gather opinions from individuals, there was another 
extensive literature review conducted on the relevant 
stakeholders. The aim was to explore and structure the 
broader scientific opinion on the interests and power 
base of each stakeholder at each stack layer in each 
scenario by leveraging the “bases of power and 
directions of interest” tool [47]. There are especially 
the bases of power, e.g. in the shape of coercion, legal 
force, knowledge or resources [6, 48, 49], that decide 
whether a stakeholder is rather likely to safeguard its 
interest compared to other involved stakeholders. This 
is crucial to substantiate the decision on a 
stakeholder’s influence [47]. Furthermore, possibly 
identified similarities or differences between 
stakeholders can be used to estimate the closeness 
among them. The stakeholder information on power 
and interests was then again added to the stakeholder 
list. 
Step 7: Assign stakeholder ranking. This step 
involves the assignment of a relative ranking to a 
stakeholder within each scenario and stack layer. This 
assignment is based on the evaluation of the different 
bases of power and directions of interest of each 
stakeholder. A stakeholder’s influence on the policy 
focus is ranked higher, when this stakeholder e.g. has 
relevant legal authority to enforce its interests. In 
contrast, another stakeholder may be in a contractual 
relationship which rather coerces this stakeholder to 
follow the will of others. “The [stakeholder] placed 
lowest received a ranking score of 1, the second lowest 
a score of 2” [6] and so on. Stakeholders can also 
receive the same ranking score. This variable is 
referred to as relative ranking (R). Once the 
assignment is completed, influence maps per stack 
layer can be created. 
Step 8: Calculate influence score. The influence 
score (InfS) is the most relevant stakeholder variable 
for this research. The influence score is an aggregated 
variable answering the question what the overall 
influence of one particular stakeholder is on a scenario 
– regardless of the frequency this stakeholder was 
identified as relevant in a scenario. Because the 
number of stakeholders can vary across stack layers in 
a scenario, it is important to transfer the relative 
rankings of a stakeholder into an adjusted ranking 
score (Ra) on scenario level. This is the base to 
calculate the influence score of each stakeholder. At 
the end of the calculation, the influence map per 
scenario level can be created. 
Step 9: Compare scenarios. In order to 
understand the changing power relations across 
scenarios, an adequate method to compare the 
stakeholder influence across scenarios was designed. 
Instead of adding another number to this qualitative 
research, it was decided to use a qualitative scale 
ranging from “High influence” at the top to “Low 
influence” at the bottom. This scale was applied to the 
calculated influence score derived within step 8. 
 
 
Figure 1. Evolving influence analysis from 
bottom to top level 
 
In summary, this approach not only provides 
insights into each stack layer, but also allows an 
aggregation from the bottom to the top. Figure 1 
illustrates the expected result types for each level and 
how those result types are linked between the levels. 
4. Results and discussion  
This chapter presents the major results obtained 
by applying the methodology presented in the third 
chapter and puts them into perspective. More details 
on all relevant stakeholders and scenarios, including 
influence maps, influence scores and rankings, are 
provided as supplemental files alongside this article. 
The results of this research show that there are 
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three scenarios. The composition reflects the different 
roles within a scenario and stack layer, and diverging 
characteristics of a stakeholder. For example, it was 
decided to split “end user” into two stakeholder groups 
consisting of “end user (citizens)” and “end user 
(company)” due to significant differences in group 
size and bases of power, which could impact the 
analysis. 
The data of this analysis shows that the number of 
relevant stakeholders varies across all scenarios and 
stack layers. Most stakeholders could be identified 
within the public blockchain scenario whereas the 
conventional IT scenarios contains the least number of 
stakeholders. Also, stakeholders are not constantly 
relevant within and across scenarios, although the 
frequency of appearance does not necessarily correlate 
with the stakeholder’s overall influence. Interestingly, 
even the group size of one stakeholder can fluctuate 
depending on the scenario. Thus, a particular group 




Figure 2. Comparison of stakeholder 
influence across scenarios 
 
For public administrations, opportunities for 
decision-making constantly decrease from the 
conventional IT, through the private to the public 
blockchain scenario (see Figure 2). This is 
understandable because they gradually lose ownership 
of IT and other stakeholders can make decisions on 
issues that were formerly solely decided by public 
administrations. This is especially true with respect to 
the public blockchain of Malta. In this public 
blockchain scenario, the Maltese public administration 
can hardly influence what decisions should be made 
and how this should happen. Large stakeholder 
groups, mainly positioned outside the Maltese 
jurisdiction, make it difficult for the Maltese public 
administration to ensure its demands are considered. 
On the blockchain stack layer, in particular, other 
stakeholders, i.e. core software developer, mining 
pools and foreign regulators, seem to set the agenda 
(see Figure 3). This is a major change compared to the 
conventional IT scenario. 
 
 
Figure 3. Comparison of the middle layers of 
the technology stack  
 
Overall, public administrations seem to have less 
power but they are not powerless. Because the 
Swedish and Maltese public administrations could act 
on all stack layers to a certain extent, makes them 
influential players nonetheless. In contrast, end users 
(citizens and companies) only play a minor role, if any, 
when it comes to influencing blockchain-related 
events or taking part in decision-making processes. 
Apparently, civic end users cannot leverage their sheer 
group size to push their manifold interests.  
Finally, IT service providers gain influence from 
their valuable resources and capacities they bring in. 
Public administrations struggle and hesitate to recruit 
such specialized and rare professionals. IT service 
provider fill this gap and act as co-producers of public 
services [50]. 
5. Conclusion  
The research presented with this article aimed to 
gain a deeper understanding of the shifting power 
relations within the area of blockchain governance to 
deliver public services. For this purpose, the power 
relations among relevant stakeholders were visualized 
and the possibilities and limitations of public 
administrations, in particular, to influence the 
development of blockchain-based public services 
evaluated. 
The results allow a tangible picture of the shifting 
power relations, as intended. It was shown that public 
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administrations are not powerless in any scenario. 
Compared to conventional IT solutions, however, their 
possibilities decrease especially with the use of public 
blockchains. Furthermore, limitations in decision 
making on all layers of the blockchain technology 
stack became apparent. Public administrations would 
need to enter into transnational partnerships to 
effectively increase the influence on public 
blockchains.  
The results indicate that public administrations 
should rather leverage private blockchain solutions if 
they are interested in keeping control. At the same 
time, private blockchains could mean higher initial 
costs because of additional efforts to set up consortium 
partnerships and the need for dedicated IT 
infrastructure. From a research perspective, a rising 
number of private blockchains increases the 
importance of interoperability to interlink private 
blockchains and, thereby, strengthen the usability of 
blockchain-based solutions. 
The decision to either use private or public 
blockchains is not only a technical one. It may also 
impact the development of public services based on 
collaborative governance. Public blockchains, 
especially Bitcoin, are not tools to support truly 
democratic governance procedures. As long as 
citizens, who represent the largest stakeholder group 
by far, have little or no opportunity to participate in 
this development, the development of blockchain 
networks remains a task of a few, privileged 
stakeholders. For the time being, public 
administrations could make a difference by choosing 
private blockchains and designing more inclusive 
governance models. Consequently, further research 
should elaborate on the ways to include citizens or 
adequate representatives in the process of blockchain 
governance. 
Although this research was carefully conducted, 
there are two limitations to the findings. First of all, 
the data basis for the presented results is only partly 
empirical. There are very limited implementations 
within the public sector available which consequently 
narrows the experience of relevant stakeholders with 
matters of blockchain governance. Second, the 
calculation of the stakeholder influence scores is the 
result of qualitative methods of stakeholder analysis. 
As with any other qualitative method, this allows 
deviations with respect to the accuracy. To tackle both 
limitations, it is suggested to conduct interviews with 
relevant stakeholders, once available in sufficient 
numbers, to analyze the perceptions of those directly 
affected. This would allow the results of this research 
to be reviewed. 
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